Monday, 5 March 2012

Michael Redfern - Barrister Deceased.




Michael Redfern died last Thursday night.

 Many readers will know Michael either personally or as one of Australia's leading property lawyers.

 Michael had been ill for a number of years.

Michael was a fine lawyer, a gentlemen, a mentor to many, generous and kind.

Any person who knew Michael could not help but like him.

Apart from his many years as a solicitor, Michael made major contributions to the law in Australia as co-author of  'Australian Tenancy Practice and Precedents', the author of many articles and the presenter of many seminars.

Michael will be sadly missed but his legacy lives on and he shall never be forgotten.

Michael's funeral will be held on Friday 9 March, 2:30pm at Le Pine, 1048 Whitehorse Rd Box Hill.

Michael, may you Rest in Peace.


Friday, 17 February 2012

Presumption that no agreement intended until formal contract signed





Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com



Where an agreement concerns real estate there is a presumption that no binding contract was intended until "contracts" are exchanged.

If the agreement for sale refers to the execution of a more formal agreement, then the inference ordinarily to be drawn is that no binding contract is intended until execution of the formal agreement.

See: Elgas Ltd v A.J.Young Industries Pty Ltd (1986) 4 BPR 9,329 at 9,335 per McHugh JA.  In Encino Plaza Pty Ltd v Wilson International Pty Ltd (1988) V ConvR 63,908 Ormiston J at 63,914-5 referred to a number of cases that supported the proposition that:
where the evidence shows that involved in the negotiations is the preparation of an important commercial agreement, then the normal or prima facie inference is that the parties do not intend to be bound before the precise terms of that agreement have been finalised and executed and, if necessary, exchanged.


 My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.


Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Friday, 10 February 2012

Major victory for tenants in landlord's liquidation

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com



It has long been a vexed question whether a liquidator can disclaim a lease with the effect of extinguishing the tenant's leasehold estate or interest in the land?

In a major victory for tenants Justice Davies has answered that question with a resounding "no".

 In In the Matter of Willmott Forests Ltd (in liquidation) [2012] VSC 29 the liquidators of a "responsible entity" in a forestry scheme sought to disclaim leases to enable the transfer of clear title to land.

Section 568 of the Corporations Act 2001 permits a liquidator to "disclaim" certain types of property of the company.

The disclaimer terminates "the company's rights, interests, liabilities and property to or in respect of the disclaimed property" (s.568D(1)). In Willmott the liquidators submitted that when a lease is disclaimed, the leasehold estate ceased to exist.

Her Honour rejected the liquidator's submission. At [9] Her Honour said that the submission:
fails to give due regard to the position in law that a lease creates both contractual and proprietary rights. A lease is a contract between the parties but a lease is also the grant by the landlord of an estate in land in the tenant, which a different estate in land to the landlord's freehold estate. The leasehold estate is a legal estate of which the tenant is the owner.

Her Honour held [at 11] that a disclaimer by the liquidator would only terminate the rights, interests, liabilities and property of the landlord but would not bring the lease to an end for all purposes.  The tenant's proprietary interest in the land would not be brought to an end but would continue to subsist.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience. 


Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Why no requirement for a s.146 notice?

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com




I have had a number of queries about my last post in which I referred to N.C.Reid & Co v Pencarl Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 2241 in which Judge O'Neill held that before re-entering leased premises the landlord did not have to serve a notice that complied with s.146 of the Property Law Act 1958.

The lease permitted the landlord to re-enter if the guarantor became bankrupt. 

Readers asked why s.146 did not apply? 


Section 146 requires service of a notice where a right of re-entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation in a lease or otherwise arising by operation of law for "a breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, including a breach amounting to a repudiation". 

For s.146 to apply there must be a breach. The tenant argued that there had been  a repudiation. His Honour rejected the tenant's argument and held that the re-entry took place by reason of a contractual right; there had not been a breach and therefore no notice was required.




My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.



Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Tuesday, 7 February 2012

No s.146 notice required for contractual right to terminate


Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com




Leases often provide that the landlord may re-enter premises and end the lease if a guarantor becomes bankrupt.

In N.C.Reid & Co Pty Ltd v Pencarl Pty Ltd  [2011] VCAT2241 the guarantor became bankrupt, the landlord re-entered the premises and leased the premises to a new tenant.

The existing tenant sought relief against forfeiture and/or damages.

The tenant claimed, among other things, that the landlord should have served a notice under s.146 of the Property Law Act 1958 because the lease had been terminated "for repudiation" with the consequence that the tenant would have had 14 days to remedy the breach.

The tenant's claim was unsuccessful. Judge O'Neill held that the lease had been terminated pursuant to a contractual right and not because of a repudiation of the lease and therefore a notice that  complied with s.146 did not have to be served.

His Honour also said that in if there were a breach it could not have been rectified.




My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.



Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Friday, 9 December 2011

Section 172 of Property Law Act Explained

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com




The High Court recently  considered s37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) which is the  New South Wales equivalent of s172(1) of the Property Law Act 1958. Section 172(1) provides that:
"Save as provided in this section, every alienation of property made, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, with intent to defraud creditors, shall be voidable, at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced."

French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ approved of a decision in New Zealand where "Their Honours said that it was unnecessary to show that the debtor wanted creditors to suffer a loss or that the debtor had a purpose of causing loss: it was necessary to show the existence of an intention to hinder, delay or defeat creditors and in that sense to show that accordingly the debtor had acted dishonestly".

 See: para [32].  It was not necessary for the wrongdoer to appreciate that the act in question was dishonest judged by the standards of ordinary, decent people. See: para [33].



My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.



Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Meaning of "terms contract" examined

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com


Any practitioner who acts for vendors and purchasers of land should have a good understanding of what is and what is not a “terms contract” for the purpose of the Sale of Land Act 1962. The Act prohibits certain types of “terms contracts” and a purchaser can avoid contracts entered into in contravention of the Act. In an important decision, Dixon J in Ottedin Investments Pty Ltd v Portbury Developments Co Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 222  considered the definition of “terms contract” that has applied since 31 October 2008. Section 29A provides:
“(1) For the purposes of this Act a contract is a terms contract if it is an executory contract for           the sale and purchase of any land under which the purchaser is -

(a) obliged to make 2 or more payments (other than a deposit or final payment) to the                     vendor after the execution of the contract and before the purchaser is entitled to a                     conveyance or transfer of the land; or

(b)entitled to possession or occupation of the land before the purchaser becomes entitled to a        conveyance or transfer of the land.

  (2) In subsection (1)- deposit means a payment made to the vendor or to a person on               behalf of the vendor before the purchaser becomes entitled to possession or to the             receipt of rents and profits under the contract; final payment means a payment on the                 making of which the purchaser becomes entitled to a conveyance or transfer of the                   land.” (italics added)

Before 31 October 2008 a “terms contract” was an executory contract under which the purchaser is;

 (a) obliged to make two or more payments to the vendor after execution of the contract and before the                purchaser was entitled to a conveyance or

(b) entitled to possession or occupation of the land before becoming entitled to a conveyance or transfer.             The definition of “deposit” and “final payment” in s29A have a much wider meaning.

In Ottedin the purchaser, in December 2008 contracted to purchase land for $6.5 million and paid a deposit of $325,000 with settlement due in December 2009 upon which the purchaser became entitled to transfer and vacant possession of the land. The purchaser was unable to settle.

 By deed the parties deleted the particulars of sale and substituted new particulars under which the price remained the same but the settlement date was changed to December 2010, the deposit became $1,325,000 with $325,00 due on the day of sale and $1,000,000 due in January 2010 (increased deposit).

There was also a provision for a contingent interim payment of $3,675,000 with a final payment of $1,500,000 due at settlement.

Ottedin defaulted and sought to avoid the contract under s29O(2) of the Act on the ground that the contract was a “terms contract” that did not comply with the Act’s requirements concerning terms contracts.

The contention was that apart from the initial deposit of $325,000 and the final payment, the contract (as varied) was a terms contract because it obliged the purchaser to pay two or payments after the execution of the contract, being the balance of the deposit ($1,000,000) due in January 2010 and the interim payment of $3,675,000.

Dixon J rejected the purchaser’s contention. His Honour held that both the initial $325,000 and the increased deposit were each obligations to pay the “deposit” within the meaning of s29A.

His Honour held that the contingent interim payment of $3,675,00 (which was not paid) was either a deposit or became part of the final payment but its characterisation did not matter because even if it was an interim payment before settlement, there was still only one payment.


My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.


Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.