Parties can agree to higher standard than that imposed by section.52 of The Retail Leases Act

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. 

The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

Section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 implies into a “retail premises” lease an obligation on landlords to maintain “in a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into” things such as the “structure of, and fixtures in” the premises, “plant and equipment at retail premises” and “the appliances, fittings and fixtures provided under the lease by the landlord relating to the gas, electricity, water drainage or other services”. When is the lease entered into if an option is exercised? Is it the date when the lease commenced or when the new lease arising by reason of the option being exercised commences? In Ross-Hunt Pty Ltd v Cianjan Pty Ltd[1] the Tribunal held that that the relevant date was the date that the new term commenced following the exercise of an option and not the commencing date of the first term of the lease. A further question then arose about whether a provision in a lease that imposes a higher standard on a landlord than that imposed by s.52 is void under s.94 on the ground that it is contrary to or inconsistent with s.52. In Savers INC (ARB 075 452 185) v Herosy Nominees[2][the Tribunal held that if parties wished to contract for more than was provided for under s.52 they were free to do so; in that case the leases (and earlier leases to which the landlords and tenant were parties) contained terms that obliged the landlords to undertake repairs to the premises and imposed obligations that were more onerous than those imposed by s.52. In the recent decision of Di & Li Australia Pty Ltd v Jin Dun Pty Ltd[3] Senior Member Riegler rejected an argument that lease provisions which imposed more onerous obligations on the landlord than those imposed by s.52 were void. The Senior Member said:

"[20] In my view, s 52 does not prohibit the parties from agreeing to extend the Landlord’s obligations to repair or maintain its installations. The situation might be different if s 52 was expressed as a provision limiting a landlord’s obligation to maintain plant and equipment to a condition consistent with its condition when the lease was entered into. However, the provision does not expressly limit a landlord’s obligations but rather, imposes what I consider to be a minimum obligation on a landlord.

[21] There is nothing inconsistent or contrary to s 52 for the parties to increase that obligation and in the present case, it made eminent sense for the Landlord to continue to have that obligation upon renewal, given that it held the reversionary interest in the plant and equipment. Further, it is not the case that s 52 is devoid of any limitation. In particular, sub-section (3) sets out various circumstances which limit its operation. Those circumstances do not include limiting the comparator to the commencement of the Lease. In my opinion, it was open for Parliament to have limited the operation of s 52(2) of the Act to the current term by stating words to the effect that a lease is not to include a term which requires the landlord to maintain plant and equipment, other than in a condition commensurate with the condition of the plant and equipment at the commencement of the lease. However, the section is not expressed in such prohibitory terms, nor is it expressed to indicate any intention on the part of the legislature to ‘cover the field’ in respect of a landlord’s repair liability.”

[1] [2009] VCAT 829.

[2]2011] VCAT 1160

[3] [2014] VCAT 349

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

VCAT applies general law principles in property partition under Part IV

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

There is a dearth of authority in Victoria concerning the principles that apply in determining claims for the partition of property under Part IV of the Property Law Act 1958.  In broad terms Part IV permits a co-owner of land or goods to apply for orders in respect of that land or those goods. VCAT has the power to “make any order that it things fit to ensure that a just and fair sale or division of land or goods occurs” (s.228). The Tribunal must order the sale of the land or goods unless it considers it would be more just and fair to order the division of the land or goods (s.229(1)). In Sherwood v Sherwood [2013] VCAT 1746 the Tribunal considered and applied general law principles in determining how property should be partitioned.  The dispute was between siblings who were registered as joint proprietors of the land. The brother applied to VCAT seeking an order that he retain the land and also claimed that he had paid 92% of the loan costs and other expenses relating to the land. He and his sister were jointly liable to repay the loan with which they had purchased the land. The sister claimed that her interest in the land fixed at the date of purchase at 50% because she was jointly liable to pay the home loan and was a joint tenant.  The Tribunal held that while the Act did not say that the Tribunal’s discretion was to be applied in accordance with the general law, it would not be just and fair to disregard the general law ([27]). At [34]  Senior Member Riegler said that   “I approach the task at hand having regard to and being informed of the general law, rather than simply imposing some form of instinctive justice”.

Apart from the deposit, the parties contributed equally to the purchase price because repayments of a home loan are not counted as contributions to the purchase price. See: Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242. The applicant contended that if regard were had to the general law it would be just and fair that the Tribunal impose a remedial constructive trust in his favour of the type found in Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1985) 160 CLR 583 reflecting the unequal contributions made by him that conferred a benefit on his sister or alternatively that he was entitled to contribution from his sister and entitled to an equitable charge to secure the making of the contribution.  The Tribunal held that the parties had not purchased the property as a joint venture or joint endeavor and therefore rejected the applicant’s claim for the imposition of a remedial constructive trust. The Tribunal also held that when they purchased the land the parties had not reached an agreement as to how much of the home loan they were each to pay or what proportion of beneficial interest they each were to hold and for that reason rejected the imposition of a common intention type constructive trust in favour of the applicant.

However, because the applicant paid most of the deposit the Tribunal ordered a resulting trust in favour of the applicant that varied the legal interests of the parties to reflect the fact that they each held the land as tenants in common, with the applicant holding a 54.33% share and the respondent the balance.

The Senior Member also ordered contribution from the respondent to the applicant to the extent that he had paid more than 54.33% of the home loan payments and other outgoings.  The respondent was ordered to pay $78,000 in contribution plus interest of more than $5000.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

VCAT not bound to refer matters to arbitration

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

On 17 October 2013 I posted a note about Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd v Ireland [2013] VSC 550 which concerned a dispute between a franchisor and a franchisee. The franchise agreement contained an arbitration clause.  VCAT refused to refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to s.8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 which provides that:

“A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement must, if a party so requests not later than when the submitting party’s first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”

Justice Croft held that VCAT was not a “court” within the meaning of s.8 and therefore the dispute could be heard and determined in VCAT.

The decision is significant because many agreements, particularly franchising agreements, contain arbitration clauses. The effect of the judgment is that if a proceeding is commenced in VCAT concerning an agreement that contains an arbitration clause a party to that agreement cannot request the Tribunal to refer the matter to arbitration pursuant to s.8.  If the same proceeding were commenced in the Magistrates’ Court, the County Court or the Supreme Court, the Court could refer the proceeding to arbitration. According to Justice Croft this did not produce an absurdity because VCAT was intended to be a forum for speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes.

Justice Croft noted that a party to a proceeding in VCAT could still apply under s.77 of the VCAT Act to have the matter referred to the arbitral tribunal on the basis that it was a more appropriate forum.

In the earlier post about Subway  the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 was erroneously referred to as a Commonwealth Act; the reference should have been to a Victorian Act.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience. 

Most tenants who provide services engaged in retail provision of services

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

Many readers will be familiar with the "ultimate consumer" test that is commonly used to determine whether premises are "retail premises" within the meaning of s.4(1) of the Retail Leases Act 2003. If the premises are "retail premises" the Act applies; if premises are not "retail premises" the Act does not apply. Premises are "retail premises" if "under the terms of the lease relating to the premises" they "are used, or are to be used, wholly or predominantly for.....(a) the sale or hire of goods by retail or the retail provision of services". See: s.4(1). Nathan J in Wellington v Norwich Union Life Insurance Society Limited [1991] VR 333 held that patent attorneys (and other professional businesses such as solicitors, architects and medical specialists) conducted a business providing retail services.  His Honour held that the  "essential feature of retailing" was the provision of an item or service "to the ultimate consumer for fee or reward".  The end user might be a member of the public but was not necessarily so. The problem has been to identify the "ultimate consumer". Nathan J did not regard it as significant that a patent attorney's advice might pass through the hands of an intermediary on the way to the ultimate consumer. But what would the position be if the patent attorney's advice was used as "input" into a solicitor's advice to the solicitor's client? Would the solicitor be the "ultimate consumer"?

It will be much easier to answer these questions following the recent decision of Fitzroy Dental Pty Ltd v Metropolitan Management Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 344. The effect of the decision is that most tenants whose business provide any sort of service will be engaged in the "retail provision of services" and the Act will apply.

In Fitzroy Dental the landlord leased premises premises comprising a cafe/restaurant and a conference centre and facilities to a tenant who in turn received bookings from conference or function providers to conduct functions and conferences. The cafe/restaurant was used only for the provision of food and drink to the attendees at the functions and conferences. The landlord commenced a proceeding against the tenant in the Supreme Court. The tenant contended that VCAT had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the  dispute because it was "retail tenancy dispute" within the meaning of s.81(1) of the Act. See: s.89(4). The permitted use under the lease was "Conference Centre, Cafe/Restaurant Area and associated office and storage area".

Justice Croft held that the dispute between the landlord and the tenant was a "retail tenancy dispute" that had to be determined by VCAT. The conference facilities were open to the public in the sense that a member of the public (ie the conference provider) could approach the tenant to book the conference facilities. After reviewing the authorities His Honour held that conference provider was the "ultimate consumer" of services provided to him by the tenant. Those services were in turn an "input" into the different services provided to the attendees at functions and conferences.  Thus, there were two transactions involving the retail provision of services. The transaction between the tenant and the conference organising entity was for monetary consideration while the second transaction with the attendees did not always involve a fee or reward for the provision of services. It did not matter that the bodies organising the conferences and hiring the premises from the tenant were governmental authorities or public bodies such as a university, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, the Police Federation or an industry association because such bodies had the capacity to enter into ordinary commercial agreements.

The case contains a helpful analysis of the relevant caselaw.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience. Green

Be wary of unrepresented parties at mediations

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com/

Mediations at which parties are unrepresented or not represented by lawyers are fraught with risk. Even with legal representation mediations are stressful, particularly where the mediation is only fixed for a half day and there is pressure to avoid long winded discussions about the facts. Experienced mediators invariably offer unrepresented parties an adjournment so that legal advice can be obtained. VCAT recently decided case in which landlords sought to set aside terms of settlement agreed at a half day mediation conducted by the Small Business Commissioner. In Wong v Hook Line and Sinker Fish and Chips Pty Ltd [2013] VCAT 263 the landlords sought to have the terms of settlement set aside on the grounds of undue influence or duress by the mediator and a barrister.  At the mediation the parties had been in dispute about whether the tenant was being required to pay “key money” under a lease contrary to s.23 of the Retail Leases Act 2003. The terms of settlement required the parties to appoint a valuer to determine the market rent. The landlords were not represented by a lawyer at the mediation but were represented by an advocate who held himself out as an expert in retail tenancy matters and who prepared written submissions. The mediator was highly experienced and was accompanied by a trainee mediator. The tenant was represented by an experienced barrister. The mediator offered the landlords the opportunity to adjourn the mediation to enable them to obtain legal advice but the offer was declined. The landlords subsequently refused to appoint the valuer to determine the market rent and commenced a proceeding alleging that the terms of settlement had been obtained by undue influence or duress. At the hearing the mediator, the trainee mediator, the tenant's barrister at the mediation, representatives of the tenant, the landlords and the landlords' advocate all gave evidence. The Tribunal rejected all of the the landlords’ claims. An application for leave to appeal has been filed.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience. 

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Damages assessed on breach of collateral contract to grant a new term

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

In an earlier post I referred to two cases in which the operator of restaurants in the Melbourne Casino and Entertainment Complex  succeeded in claims that they were entitled to additional 5 year terms despite their leases not containing such a term. See: Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Limited and Fish and Company (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown  Melbourne Limited [2012] VCAT 225. The tenants, who operated the restaurants "Waterfront" and "Cafe Greco", succeeded in claims that Crown had breached a collateral contract that they would be granted an additional 5 year term after the expiry of the 5 year term provided for in their leases. The tenants claimed that they were induced to spend millions of dollars on fit-outs because of a promise that there existing leases would be renewed. At the end of the intial 5 year term Crown refused to renew the leases and the area occupied by restaurants was leased to new tenants. Crown denied the existence of any collateral contract. Damages and interest have now been assessed with the tenants being awarded a total of more than $2,000,000. See: Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Limited and Fish and Company (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown  Melbourne Limited (VCAT, unreported, 8 February 2013).

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Tenant seeks to overturn VCAT's exclusive jurisidiction

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

In Ireland v Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd and Subway Realty Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1061 a tenant contended if an agreement (which it contended was a licence) was held to be a lease then the dispute had to be determined by an arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration clause and not by VCAT.  The arbitration clause was contained in the a document separate from the lease.

VCAT held that the agreement was a lease and therefore there was a "retail tenancy dispute" which, subject to the tenant's argument about the Commercial Arbitration Act, would be governed by the dispute provisions of the RLA. If the tenant's application had succeeded the whole regime of the dispute resolutions provisions in the RLA would have been displaced. The tenant argued that the arbitration clause should be given effect to because s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 was pronounced after the commencement of the 2003 Act and, by implication, repealed the provisions of the RLA that gave exclusive jurisdiction  concerning retail tenancy disputes to VCAT.  

The tenant contended that the word “court”  in s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act included the Tribunal. At [45] the Tribunal accepted that there was authority supporting the proposition that, in some cases, the reference to a “court” will include the Tribunal. The tenant contended that to construe the word “court” in the Commercial Arbitration Act to include the Tribunal would not create inconsistency between that Act and the RLA because the Commercial Arbitration Act was a later Act of Parliament which would, by implication repeal the inconsistent provisions of the RLA.  In rejecting the tenant’s contentions the Tribunal said:

 [50]       I do not accept that submission. In Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1 at 10, Barton J adopted the following statement from Hardcastle on Statutory Law:

The court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together, before they can from the language of the later imply the repeal of an express prior enactment, i.e., the repeal must, if not express flow from the necessary implication.

[51]       Further, in Saraswati v R (1991) 100 ALR 193 Gaudron J stated the following;

It is a basic rule of construction that, in the absence of express words, an earlier statutory provision is not repealed, altered or derogated from by a later provision unless an intention to that effect is necessarily to be implied. There must be very strong grounds to support the implication, for there is a general presumption that the legislature intended that both provisions should operate and that, to the extent that they would otherwise overlap, one should be read as subject to the other (at 204)

[53]         In my view, limiting the word court in s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 to mean the Magistrates’ Court, County Court or Supreme Court would not lead to any inconsistency between the two Acts and is a construction that is to be adopted, having regard to the authorities cited above. Accordingly, I do not accept the submission that the word court in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 includes the Tribunal. It simply cannot be the case that Parliament intended that the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 and the RLA were to cover the same field of operation. The RLA is expressed elaborately and specifically details how retail tenancy disputes are to be resolved. The Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 says nothing about resolving retail tenancy disputes and is expressed in a general manner. In my view, that is another factor weighing against a finding that Parliament intended the provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 to take precedence over the dispute resolution provisions of the RLA. Accordingly, I find that the word court in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 does not include the Tribunal and as a consequence, the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 has no application in determining the present dispute.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

 Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Collateral contract not a disposition of an interest in land

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

Earlier today I referred to two recent cases in which tenants successfully claimed that they had entered into collateral contracts with the operator of the Melbourne Casino and Entertainment Complex that entitled them to a further 5 year term following the 5 year term provided for in the lease. See: Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown Melbourne Limited and Fish and Company (Vic) Pty Ltd v Crown  Melbourne Limited (VCAT, unreported, 24 February 2012). 

I have been asked whether the collateral contracts were in writing and signed by Crown and, if not, why they were not caught by the Statute of Frauds. 

The collateral contracts alleged were oral. Crown alleged that the tenants could not succeed because there was nothing in writing signed by Crown as required by the Statute of Frauds (ie s.126 of the Instruments Act 1958). VCAT held that the oral contracts did not relate to a  disposition of an interest in land because all they required Crown to do was send a notice that it would renew the lease. 

The collateral contracts were effectively an option exercisable by the tenant: that is an offer to grant a further term which Crown was contractually precluded from withdrawing while the option remained exercisable; there was no disposition of an interest in land until the tenant exercised the option; if the tenant did not exercise the option there was no disposition of an interest in land. See: BS Stillwell & Co v Budget Rent a Car System [1990] VR 589 at 594. 

The cases contain an interesting discussion about the circumstances in which a collateral contract can be effective.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Why no requirement for a s.146 notice?

Please note for members of the public or practitioners in the legal profession where English is your second language a translation key in all languages of the world is available on this blog to assist you. The plain English blog without translation facilities is located at http://roberthaypropertybarrister.wordpress.com

I have had a number of queries about my last post in which I referred to N.C.Reid & Co v Pencarl Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 2241 in which Judge O'Neill held that before re-entering leased premises the landlord did not have to serve a notice that complied with s.146 of the Property Law Act 1958.

The lease permitted the landlord to re-enter if the guarantor became bankrupt. 

Readers asked why s.146 did not apply? 

Section 146 requires service of a notice where a right of re-entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation in a lease or otherwise arising by operation of law for "a breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, including a breach amounting to a repudiation". 

For s.146 to apply there must be a breach. The tenant argued that there had been  a repudiation. His Honour rejected the tenant's argument and held that the re-entry took place by reason of a contractual right; there had not been a breach and therefore no notice was required.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Put in repair obligations not contrary to s.52 of the Retail Leases Act2003

There is a translation key(widget) this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals. http://roberthaybarrister.blogspot.com.au/


In Retail Leases Victoria (Croft and Hay, LexisNexis) expressed the view (at para [70,005]) that a repair obligation imposed on a tenant that went beyond the obligation imposed on a landlord under s.52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 would not be void under s.94 on the basis that it was contrary to or inconsistent with s.52.

The authors suggest that a provision in a lease that imposed a “put in repair” obligation on the tenant and which obliged it not to pick up the landlord’s "keep in repair" obligation under s.52, but rather, to place the premises, plant and equipment and fixtures and fittings in a higher standard of repair than they were in “when the retail lease was entered into” would be effective. Croft and Hay state (at para [70,005]) that a repair covenant that required the tenant to make up the "gap" between the fruits of a landlord's "keep in repair" covenant and a "put in repair" covenant" might be effective provided the lease provisions clearly established a capital works obligation on a tenant at its expense for the purposes of s.41(2).

In the authors' view there appeared to be no reason why the landlord could not enforce this obligation and, if necessary, recover the cost of the tenant's repair obligations as an "outgoing" (as defined in s 3) under s 39 . Croft and Hay's views were adopted by VCAT in Computer & Parts Land Pty Ltd v Aust-China Yan Tai Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 2054 (at para [199] to [205]; see in particular para [203]) in deciding that a clause in a lease which required the tenant to contribute $3300 towards the cost of an air-conditioning system was a “put in repair” obligation with the consequence that the tenant had to reimburse the landlord for that cost.

My clerk can be contacted via this link for bookings  http://www.greenslist.com.au/

Goods left on premises after the expiry or termination of a lease

There is a translation key(widget) this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals. http://roberthaybarrister.blogspot.com.au/

On 1 September 2011 the law governing goods left on leased premises following the termination of a lease will be governed by Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act 1999. Part 2D replaces the repealed ss.42A to 42F of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1958. Part 2D applies to “goods under bailment” (s.32ZS(1)).

A landlord is not usually the voluntary recipient of goods left on leased premises. The drafters of the legislation have assumed that a bailment exists in the absence of a conscious and willing assumption of the possession of the goods; they do not appear to have been concerned about Palmer’s statement that the approach of the English courts has been to deny that the involuntary recipient of goods is a bailee (Palmer, N.P, Palmer on Bailment, 2009, Sweet & Maxwell, page 703).  

Part 2D also fails to include a satisfactory definition of “bailment”. Section 32ZP of the proposed Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act defines  “bailment” as including:

“bailment for reward, bailment in the course of business, gratuitous bailment, involuntary bailment and any sub-bailment”. (underlining added)

 Unfortunately the expression “involuntary bailment” is not defined. Part 2D would have no application at all if VCAT or a court were to determine that a bailment relationship did not arise between a landlord and a tenant with respect to uncollected goods in premises following the expiry or determination of the lease.

A landlord could face the risk of being liable in conversion if it disposed of the goods. The legislation appears to be mainly concerned with ensuring that the bailee is paid moneys owing in respect of goods; however, a landlord is not usually owed money with respect to goods: the landlord is usually owed rent or outgoings. Part 2D establishes different regimes for the disposal of goods with each regime dependent on the value of the goods. The relevant values are: less than $200; less than $5000 and more than $5000. Part 2D does not affect the right of parties to a lease to make an agreement about the disposal of uncollected goods (Section 32ZS(6)).

My clerk can be contacted via this link for bookings  http://www.greenslist.com.au/

Section 52 - when is the lease "entered into"?

There is a translation key(widget)  on this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals



Section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003  is proving to be a difficult provision to apply. Section 52 implies into a retail premises lease a term that:

"The landlord is responsible for maintaining in a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into -

(a)     the structures of, and fixtures in, the retail premises lease; and

(b)     plant and equipment at the retail premises; and

....." (s.52(2))

When is the lease "entered into"?   If the tenant occupies premises for 5 years and exercises an option for a further 5 years what is the date at which the "condition of the premises" is assessed; at the commencement of the first term of 5 years or at the commencement of the second term of 5 years? 

In Ross-Hunt Pty Ltd v Cianjan Pty Ltd [2009] VCAT 829 Deputy President Macnamara held that the relevant date was the date that the new term commenced following the exercise of an option.  The lesson for tenants is that a thorough assessment of the state of the premises should be undertaken when the tenant first occupies the premises; regular reviews of the state of the premises should also be undertaken during the term; and the landlord should be requested to undertake repairs during the term.

My clerk can be contacted via this link for bookings  http://www.greenslist.com.au/

What is the tenant to do if the landlord unreasonbly withholds consentto an assignment?

There is a translation key(widget)  on this blog for ease of reading for non-English speaking members of the public or professionals.



Where a landlord refuses consent to an assignment of the term of the lease the tenant's usual remedy is to seek a declaration that the landlord has unreasonably withheld consent. Damages are not normally available because in the absence of clear words provisions requiring the landlord's consent are construed as merely amounting to a qualification of the covenant not to assign.

See: Bradbrook, Croft & Hay Commercial Tenancy Law, para 15.9. Vickery J's decision in Xiao  v Perpetual Trustee Company Limited & Anor [2008] VSC 41 poses real problems for tenants because at [21] he held that s.124(1) of the VCAT Act only empowered VCAT to grant a declaration instead of an order it could make or in addition to an order it could make. His Honour said:

"Given that Mr Xiao does not claim damages, in order to enliven the jurisdiction of VCAT to grant a declaration, he would have needed to claim, or demonstrate that he was entitled to claim, other relief, for example by way of a permanent injunction pursuant to s 123 of the VCAT Act, before a declaration could be granted."

Because the tenant is not usually seeking other relief or not entitled to other relief what is it to do?

The same problem will arise if a tenant and landlord seek a declaration that moneys to be paid by a tenant are not key money (see s.23 of the Retail Leases Act 2003)

My clerk can be contacted via this link for bookings  http://www.greenslist.com.au/

Parliament needs to clarify VCAT's powers to grant declarations.