Rent reviews - mandatory or at the landlord's discretion?

The issue of whether a lease requires a rent review or whether the review is at the discretion of the landlord often arises. The problem can avoided by clear drafting. In Growthpoint Properties Australian Limited v Austalia Pacific Airports [2014] VSC 556 the court had to decide whether a rent review was mandatory under the lease or whether the review was at the discretion of the landlord.

Clause 4.2 of the lease provided that:

“On each Market Review Date, the Rent is to be adjusted by a market review in accordance with the Market Review Method….”

Part B of the Lease provided:

“On each Market Review Date, the Rent will be adjusted by a market review if:

(a) APAM gives written notice to the Tenant (“Rent Review Notice”) setting out APAM’s opinion of the market rent for the Premises as at the Market Review Date; and

(b) the Rent Review Notice is given to the Tenant in the period between 6 months before and 6 months after the Market Review Date.

New Rent applies unless a dispute notice is served.

The Rent stated in the Rent Review Notice applies from the Market Review Date unless the Tenant gives APAM a notice disputing the specified Rent (“Dispute Notice”) within 21 days after the Rent Review Notice is given.”

The controversy between the tenant and the landlord arose from the imperative language in clause 4.2 (“is to be adjusted”) and the use of the conditional language in Part B (“will be adjusted”).

The tenant contended that the clauses, when read together were ambiguous and that there was a conflict between the clauses. On the tenant’s construction of the lease the landlord was obliged to initiate a rent review.

The landlord submitted that the rent provisions gave the landlord an entitlement, but not an obligation, to give the lessee a rent review notice.

The court held that the rent provisions gave the landlord an entitlement, but not an obligation, to give the lessee a rent review notice.

The case is useful because it discusses in detail the principles governing the construction of leases and rent review clauses and highlights the need to examine the lease as a whole. Of particular interest is the discussion about the purpose of rent review clauses: the House of Lords in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v Burnley Borough Council [1978] AC 904 viewed the benefit of a rent review to the landlord as being the ability to adjust rent market with the benefit to the tenant being seen as the security of a long lease.

The lease in Growthpoint was a commercial lease. If the lease is a “retail premises lease” a tenant may initiate a rent review if the landlord fails to do so within 90 days after the period provided for in the lease for the review. See: s.35(5) of the Retail Leases Act 2003.

Management fees - Practice Note for LIV's November 2012 lease revision

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The Law Institute of Victoria is issuing a Practice Notice concerning the reference to the amount of, and the calculation of, management fees in item 10 of  the schedule in the November 2012 Revision. The Practice Note says:

"When using the LIV Commercial lease for a retail premises lease containing an option to renew and under which management fees will be payable, it is recommended that:

• Item 10 of the Schedule be modified by deleting the paragraph beginning ‘If the Act applies’ and ending ‘section 49(4)’.


• The information relating to the amount of the management fee and the method of calculating the amount payable by the tenant, for the first accounting period of the lease term, be specified in the disclosure statement rather than the lease.  This will satisfy section 49(1)(b) without creating potential issues where an option is exercised.  When an option is exercised, the disclosure statement for the new term should also specify the management fee and the method of calculating the amount payable by the tenant for the first accounting period of the new lease."

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister and Derry Devine subject to copyright under DMCA.

The Practice Note was drafted by Derry Davine and Robert Hay.

Option not exercised because of default

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In Computer & Parts Land Pty Ltd v Property Sunrise Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1522 the Tribunal was asked to determine whether an option contained in a lease was not exercisable by the tenant because of breaches of the lease that enlivened s.27(2) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 .  Section 27(2) provides that the "only circumstances" in which an option is not exercisable is if the "tenant has not remedied any defaults under the lease about which the landlord has given the tenant written notice" (s.27(2)(a)) or " the tenant has persistently defaulted under the lease throughout its term and the landlord has given the tenant written notice of the defaults" (s.27(2)(b)). Section 27(2)(b) is ambiguous: what is meant by "persistently", what is meant by "throughout its term", does a landlord have to give notice of each default or is one notice that describes all the defaults adequate? There have been a number of cases concerning s.27(2) all of which have avoided giving any definitive answers to these questions. 

See: for example, Westgate Battery  Company Pty Ltd v GCA Pty Ltd [2005] VCAT 2080 and Westside Real Estate Investments Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 1830. In this case the term of  the lease was four years with two options for four year terms. The landlord relied on s.27(2)(a) and (b) in alleging that the option had not been exercised because at the time of the purported exercise the tenant had not remedied a default and the tenant had persistently defaulted under the lease throughout the four year term of the first option period. Firstly, the  Tribunal held that s.27(2) prevailed over the provisions contained in the lease concerning the exercise of the option.  

There had been nine occasions “over two stretches” when the rent was not paid on time and the rent had never been more than five weeks’ late. The Tribunal held that in those circumstances it was not “persuaded that the late payments could be described as ‘persistent’ (in the sense of ‘persevering’ or ‘constantly repeated’)" and that the late repayments had not occurred “throughout” the term of the lease.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that the option had not been exercised because when the tenant exercised the option it had failed to provide a bank guarantee as required by the lease and the landlord had given written notice of the default  (s. 27(2)(a)).  Rectification of the default after the purported exercise of the option did not alter the position.

The tenant sought relief against forfeiture of the option. The Tribunal followed the decision of Dixon J in Lontav Pty Ltd v Pineross Custodial Services Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2011] VSC 485 in  holding that VCAT had no power to grant relief against forfeiture of an option.

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No s.146 notice required for contractual right to terminate

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Leases often provide that the landlord may re-enter premises and end the lease if a guarantor becomes bankrupt.

In N.C.Reid & Co Pty Ltd v Pencarl Pty Ltd  [2011] VCAT2241 the guarantor became bankrupt, the landlord re-entered the premises and leased the premises to a new tenant.

The existing tenant sought relief against forfeiture and/or damages.

The tenant claimed, among other things, that the landlord should have served a notice under s.146 of the Property Law Act 1958 because the lease had been terminated "for repudiation" with the consequence that the tenant would have had 14 days to remedy the breach.

The tenant's claim was unsuccessful. Judge O'Neill held that the lease had been terminated pursuant to a contractual right and not because of a repudiation of the lease and therefore a notice that  complied with s.146 did not have to be served.

His Honour also said that in if there were a breach it could not have been rectified.

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Leases May Require Substantial Fitouts for the Purpose of the Intended Use

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Leases often require tenants to undertake substantial fit outs and it is common for landlords to contribute to the fit-out. A turn key arrangement for example,

In a recent case in New South Wales the landlord covenanted that "immediately upon receipt of the lease duly executed by the Lessee and the Bank Guarantee it will pay to the Lessee the sum of $45,000 being the Lessor's contribution to the Lessee's fitout of the premises". 

The option clause made no reference to the covenant being excluded in a new lease following the exercise of the option. The tenant claimed that following the exercise of the option it was entitled to be paid $45,000.

The primary judge held that because the lessor's payment was for a fixed sum it was clearly an "absurdity" to give the lease a literal meaning and he declined to do. 

See: Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan  Properties Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1203 at [17]. At [16] the primary judge said 'it is difficult to imagine the parties intended that $45,000 would be paid irrespective of whether there was a fit out or paid in full in a case where the cost of fit out was less than $45,000 but that is the claim of the plaintiff'.  

The Court of Appeal allowed the tenant's appeal. See: Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 297. The Court of Appeal examined the caselaw dealing with "absurdity".  Basten JA at [17] held that the test of absurdity "is not easily satisfied" and said that "the courts have no mandate to rewrite agreements, so as to depart from the language used by the parties, merely to give a provision an operation which, as it appears to the court, might make more commercial sense". e following the exercise of an option.



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Beware of lease variations

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It is trite law that a slight variation to a lease may effect a surrender and re-grant. See: Pascoe-Webbe  v Nuguna Pty Ltd (1985) 3 BPR 97,231 (SC, NSW per Young J).

 In Richmond Football Club Limited v Verraty Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 2104 a variation to a lease had major consequences for an unwitting and unfortunate landlord. The lease, which had been made in 1998, was for a term of 10 years with an option for a further term of 10 years and required the tenant to pay land tax and outgoings.

In 2004 the lease was varied: the changes included reducing the rent, amending the bank guarantee and rent review provisions, introducing an obligation to pay GST and extending the lease term by 10 years. The tenant contended that the variation effected a surrender and re-grant with the consequence that from the date of the variation the Retail Leases Act 2003 applied to the lease.

By reason of s.50 of the 2003 Act a provision in a lease requiring a tenant to pay land tax is void. Also, by reason of s.46 of the 2003 Act a tenant was not required to contribute to outgoings until given a statement of outgoings. The tenant sought recovery of land tax and outgoings paid after the variation.

The landlord claimed that the tenant was estopped from alleging that a surrender and re-grant occurred; this submission was rejected on two bases, namely that the tenant had not been aware of its rights until 2009 and the provisions of the 2003 Act could not be circumvented on the basis of estoppel.

The tenant sought recovery of the land tax and outgoings on the basis that they were paid under a mistake because the tenant was unaware that it had no liability to do so.

 Consequently, there was a total failure of consideration and therefore the landlord was obliged to repay the amount paid by way of land tax and outgoings as money had and received.

The landlord’s defences based on estoppel and unconscionable conduct failed. The landlord also relied on Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v The Dog Depot Pty Ltd (2006)VSCA 6 in alleging that good consideration had been provided by the landlord for the payments; this claim was rejected with respect to land tax because there was no obligation on a tenant to pay land tax and s.50 of the 2003 Act expressly prohibited a tenant from recovering land tax.

The landlord’s argument based on The Dog Depot was successful with respect to outgoings because outgoings were part of the consideration payable by the tenant; the tenant received a benefit in exchange for the payment of outgoings and therefore the tenant’s claim for money had and received failed. The landlord also relied on The Dog Depot to claim compensation for lost land tax based on the tenant’s use and occupation of the premises; this claim failed because consideration had not been given for the payment of the land tax. The tenant recovered $125,320 in land tax, being all the land tax paid that was not caught by the Limitations of Actions Act 1958.

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Can a landlord's failure to comply with s.52 consitute repudiatoryconduct?

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Does a landlord's failure to comply with its obligations under s.52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 to maintain premises in "a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into" constitute repudiatory conduct?

This issue was raised in C & A Delaveris Pty Ltd  v Bretair Pty Ltd  [2009]VCAT 1663 [28], [79] and [80] but not ultimately decided.  The implication of a statutory obligation as a lease covenant “invites the application of the full range of the general law principles with respect to competing covenant obligations” (Croft and Hay Retail Leases Victoria, para  [70,005]).

In Delvaris the Tribunal considered the relationship between the usual “no deductions” rent covenant and a statutory repair covenant.  The tenant withheld rent because of a failure to carry out urgent repairs.  Delvaris concerned ss25 and 47 of the predecessor to the 2003 Act but those provisions are the same as ss.52 and 94 of the 2003 Act.   Section 94 renders void any provision that is contrary to or inconsistent with the Act. In refusing an application for possession the Tribunal said at [84]:

“It is in accordance with well established practice to allow a setoff of the liquidated sum incurred by a tenant in meeting a repair obligation owed by the landlord and reducing the rental liability accordingly Lee-Parker v Izzet [1971] 1 WLR 1688, 1692-3 per Goff J. The amount of the outlay is liquidated and so the complication relating to unliquidated setoffs do not exist.”

 By reason of s.94 of the Act, where set-off and similar arguments are raised with respect to s.52, the section’s terms or operation cannot be abrogated by lease provisions such as a rent clause that requires the payment of rent "without deduction". Deputy President Macnamara said the following about this issue at [79]:

 “It seems to me arguable first, that the withholding or at least delay of the payment of rent was justified and secondly, that there were no threats of illegal action which could be regarded as economic duress in the circumstances. It will be recalled that the covenant to pay rent under this lease was a covenant to pay ‘without deductions’. 

The authorities are not at one as to whether the inclusion of these words is sufficient to prevent any equitable setoff being relied upon to impeach the demand for rent. For the reasons which I gave in Wytell Pty Ltd v Glowinski [2006] VCAT 454 the balance of authority in Victoria favours the view that the words ‘without deduction’ exclude a tenant from relying upon equitable set offs to impeach the demand for rent. 

Here, however, the covenant which the tenant alleged was being breached was one which in accordance with Section 25 of the 1998 Act as amended, the lease was ‘taken to provide’, that is, it was a statutory implied covenant. 

Section 47 of the 1998 Act provides that a provision in a retail lease is void to the extent that it claims to ‘exclude the application of any provision of this Act’. In my view, the inclusion of the words ‘without deduction’ in the covenant to pay rent is avoided by Section 47 to the extent that it limits the effect that the statutory implied covenant to repair would otherwise have, hence a breach of the repair covenant would be available as a setoff in the present case….it is clear that withholding rent in the circumstances described or delaying its payments was not a flagrant breach of the terms of the lease and obviously illegal. 

More pertinently since this step was taken to compel the lessor to do what I have held it was obliged to do any way under the terms of Section 25.”

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Goods left on premises after the expiry or termination of a lease

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On 1 September 2011 the law governing goods left on leased premises following the termination of a lease will be governed by Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act 1999. Part 2D replaces the repealed ss.42A to 42F of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1958. Part 2D applies to “goods under bailment” (s.32ZS(1)).

A landlord is not usually the voluntary recipient of goods left on leased premises. The drafters of the legislation have assumed that a bailment exists in the absence of a conscious and willing assumption of the possession of the goods; they do not appear to have been concerned about Palmer’s statement that the approach of the English courts has been to deny that the involuntary recipient of goods is a bailee (Palmer, N.P, Palmer on Bailment, 2009, Sweet & Maxwell, page 703).  

Part 2D also fails to include a satisfactory definition of “bailment”. Section 32ZP of the proposed Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act defines  “bailment” as including:

“bailment for reward, bailment in the course of business, gratuitous bailment, involuntary bailment and any sub-bailment”. (underlining added)

 Unfortunately the expression “involuntary bailment” is not defined. Part 2D would have no application at all if VCAT or a court were to determine that a bailment relationship did not arise between a landlord and a tenant with respect to uncollected goods in premises following the expiry or determination of the lease.

A landlord could face the risk of being liable in conversion if it disposed of the goods. The legislation appears to be mainly concerned with ensuring that the bailee is paid moneys owing in respect of goods; however, a landlord is not usually owed money with respect to goods: the landlord is usually owed rent or outgoings. Part 2D establishes different regimes for the disposal of goods with each regime dependent on the value of the goods. The relevant values are: less than $200; less than $5000 and more than $5000. Part 2D does not affect the right of parties to a lease to make an agreement about the disposal of uncollected goods (Section 32ZS(6)).

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Quirk in s.64 nothing to get excited about

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A quirk in s.64 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 has caused some excitement. recently.

Section 64 applies where a retail premises lease does not have an option to renew the lease for a further term. At least 6 months and no more than 12 months before the lease term ends the landlord must give written notice to the tenant either offering the tenant a renewal of the lease or informing the tenant that the landlord does not propose to offer the tenant a renewal ("initial notice")(s.64(2)) .

If the landlord fails to give the initial notice the landlord must give the tenant a notice containing the same information as the initial notice ("the second notice") and the lease continues until the day specified in the second notice which must be at least 6 months after the second notice is given or the tenant gives the landlord a notice under s.64(5) ("the tenant's notice") (s.64(4)). If the landlord fails to give the initial notice the tenant may, irrespective of whether the landlord has given the later notice, give the tenant's notice terminating the lease "from a day that is not earlier than the day on which the term of the lease expires" (s.64(5)).

The section does not specify the latest date by which the tenant can terminate the lease.

The question arises whether the tenant's notice can nominate a day many years in the future for the termination of the lease. In my view, the answer is no: if the tenant gives a tenant's notice after the landlord has given the second notice the tenant's notice  can terminate the lease from a date earlier than that specified in the second notice, but cannot extend the date referred to in the second notice; in my view the purpose of the tenant's notice is to enable the tenant to terminate the lease from a day earlier that that specified by the landlord.

If the landlord does not serve the second notice and the tenant serves a tenant's notice the date specified in the tenant's notice will be the date the lease expires; however, if the landlord then serves the second notice the date specified for termination of the lease will be the relevant date provided it is at least 6 months after the second notice is given.

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Deemed assignments and landlord's consent

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Leases commonly deem there to be an assignment of the term of the lease if change in the principal shareholding of the tenant or the directors of the tenant takes place that that alters the effective control of the tenant.

The landlord's written consent is usually required to such an assignment. If there is a term in the lease that excludes the operation of s.144 of the Property Law Act 1958 the following question arises:  does the landlord have an absolute right to refuse consent or is it subject to any duties in considering whether to grant or withhold consent to the assignment?

In Lindholm v Tsourlinis Distributors Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 195 Finkelstein J held at [49] that a landlord in considering whether to grant or withhold consent is "bound to act in good faith".

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What is a 'tenant in possession": s42(2)(e) of TLA

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In Victoria a purchaser of land takes the land subject to "the interests of a tenant in possession of the land". See: s.42(2)(e) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958.  The section protects a person who is in actual occupation of the land.

Finkelstein J said the following  in  Money for Living (Aust) Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) v Money for Living (Aust) Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2006] FCA 1285 at [24]–[25]:

".....The effect of s 42(2)(e) is that the estate of a registered proprietor of land (including the proprietor of a mortgage) is subject to the rights of a tenant in possession. In this area the relevant principles are clearly established. The first is that the possession of a tenant is notice of any right of the tenant affecting the land: McMahon v Swan [1924] VLR 397 at 406. The second is that, as Dixon J confirmed in Burke v Dawes (1938) 59 CLR 1 at 17–18, s 72 of the Transfer of Land Act 1928 (Vic) (which is the forerunner of s 42) was not intended to apply merely to a tenancy as commonly understood. See also Downie v Lockwood [1965] VR 257 at 259 where Smith J said “As appears from the cases the exception in s 42 (2) (e) is to be widely construed; and it is to be treated as producing the result that “any person in actual occupation of the land obtains as against any inconsistent registered dealing protection and priority for any equitable interest to which his occupation is incident, provided that at law his occupation is referable to a tenancy of sort, whether at will or for years”. 

Thus, for the purposes of the section a purchaser under a contract, who is given possession by the vendor and is only a tenant at will, is protected in respect of his equitable ownership: Robertson v Keith (1870) 1 VLR(E) 11. So, too, is a vendor who remains in possession until the purchase price is paid: he is a tenant “whatever might be the legal denomination of the tenancy”: The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v McCaskill (1897) 23 VLR 10 at 12.

It has also been held that an equitable life estate will prevail over a subsequent registered interest: Black v Poole (1895) 16 ALT 155."

(See also Haslam v Money for Living (Aust) Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1536 at [19])

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s.42(2)(e) of Transfer of Land Act 1958

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Traditionally leases in Victoria have not been registered because of the protection afforded by s. 42(2)(e) of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 which provides that :

"....land which is included in any folio of the Register or registered instrument shall be subject to -


(e)   the interests of (but excluding any option to purchase) of a tenant in possession of the land;"

Because of s.42(2)(e) any purchaser of the relevant land was bound by the lease.


The reference to "tenant in possession" means a person in actual possession of the land. See: Burke v Dawes (1937-38) 59 CLR 1 at 17-18;  Balanced Securities Ltd v Bianco [2010] VSC 162 at [79].

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Section 146 notices

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There is a common misconception that receipt of a valid notice under s 146(1) of the Property Law Act 1958 requires the tenant to rectify the defaults alleged   within the time specified. 

The purpose of a notice is to give the tenant an opportunity to consider its position and give a response: See: Primary RE Limited v Great Southern Property Holdings Limited [2011] VSC 242 [147].

If the breach is capable of remedy, an adequate response may be to admit the breach and propose a course of remediation. See: Primary RE [147].  In Primary RE the tenants had failed to comply with lease and forestry agreements. At [132] Judd J said that a “sufficient response” by the tenant to the notices would have been to undertake to recommence management of the plantations and perform its obligations under each lease and to agree to pay compensation for any damage to the reversion. At [147] His Honour said:

 “…having received the noticed of default, a sufficient response from the tenant to avoid forfeiture, re-entry or termination, would have been to recommence management of the plantations in compliance with its obligations under each lease and forestry agreement, coupled with a proposal to pay reasonable compensation for any injury to the reversion. In my view it would not have been necessary for the tenant to do more in order to avoid the risk of termination, provided the tenant had the capacity and communicated a genuine intention to do as proposed. Nothing of the kind was communicated by the tenant to any of the landlords. The fact that the remediation work, identified in the notices, might take one or more years was not a determining factor in the calculation of a reasonable time within which to respond.”

As to what is a "reasonable time" for the lessee to respond to a statutory notice, Judd J said at [140} that this “depends upon the purpose for which the notice is given, the nature of the breaches alleged and what is required to be done to avoid forfeiture”.

A reasonable time is not the time necessary to actually undertake the work.

 The reference in s 146(1)  "compensation"  is directed to loss suffered as a consequence of damage to the reversion and is not “intended a substitute for remediation” ([133]). The landlord need not specify in the statutory notice the amount of "compensation" necessary to satisfy the demand.

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Is a purchaser of land bound by covenants in a lease?

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When premises are sold the question often arises as to whether a tenant can enforce  covenants contained in the lease against the new owner?

At common law, unaffected by statute, an assignee of the reversion is not bound by any of the covenants and conditions of the lease. See: In re Hunter's Lease [1942] 1 Ch 124 at 128. In Victoria, s 142 of the Property Law Act 1958 altered this position and an assignee of the reversion is bound by covenants contained in the lease that "touch and concern" the land. In Specialist Diagnostic Services Pty Ltd v Healthscope Ltd [2010] VSC 44 Croft J held that a restraint of trade clause contained in a lease did not "touch and concern" the leased land and therefore did not bind the assignee of the reversion.


The case contains a detailed analysis of the type of covenants that "touch and concern" land (see [52] - [67]). In broad terms any covenant that affects the landlord as a landlord or the tenant as a tenant will probably be within the class of covenants that touch and concern the land. See: Bradbrook, Coft & Hay Commercial Tenancy Law, 3rd ed, paragraph 15.20, p. 483.

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Tenant’s fixtures

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Section 28(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1958 has been repealed. Section 28(2) provided that:

“If any tenant holding lands by virtue of any lease or agreement ….. at his own cost and expense erects any building either detached or otherwise or erects or puts in any building  fence engine machinery or fixtures for any purpose whatever (which are not erected or put in in pursuance of some obligation in that behalf) then, unless there is a provision to the contrary in the lease or agreement constituting the tenancy, all such buildings fences engines machinery or fixtures shall be the property of the tenant and shall be removable by him during his tenancy or during such further period of possession by him as he holds the premises ….”

Section 28(2) has been held to operate according to the plain meaning of its terms (Vopak Terminals Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 12 VR 351 at 369-370) : while the tenant remained in possession the affixed chattels continued to be the tenant’s property and be removable by the tenant during the tenancy or during such further period of possession by the tenant holding the premises and not afterwards.

Given its comprehensive judicial consideration it is unclear why Parliament decided to tamper with the section. What was s.28(2) now appears as s.154A of the Property Law Act 1958 as follows:

“(1)    A tenant who at his or her own cost or expense has installed fixtures on, or renovated, altered or added to, a rented premises owns those fixtures, renovations, alterations or additions and may remove them before the relevant agreement terminates or during any extended period of possession of the premises, but not afterwards.

(2)    A tenant who removes any fixtures, renovations, alterations or additions under subsection (1) must-
(a)    restore the premises to the condition they were in immediately before the installation, renovation, alteration or addition, fair wear and tear excepted; or
(b)    pay the landlord an amount equal to the reasonable cost of restoring the premises to that condition.

(3)    This section does not apply to the extent that-
(a)    the lease otherwise provides; or
(b)    the landlord and the tenant otherwise agree.”

The new provision is confusing: what is the “relevant agreement” (sub-clause (1)); is it the lease or can it be some other agreement; in sub-clause 3(a) the term “lease” is used?   In sub-clause (2) it is not clear whether the tenant’s restoration obligations:
(a)    apply only to the area of the premises where “fixtures, renovations, alterations or additions” were removed; or
(b)    extend to the whole of the premises.

My clerk can be contacted via this link for bookings  http://www.greenslist.com.au/