"Claw back" of lease incentives thrown into doubt

Landlords often offer incentives to a tenant to encourage the tenant to enter a lease. Common incentives are rent free periods and contributions to the fit out. The logic behind the inducement is that the landlord will benefit because the tenant will occupy the premises for the term of the lease. Landlords sometimes require a “claw back” provision in the lease so that if the landlord terminates the lease before the expiry of the term the lease incentive (or part of the lease incentive) must be repaid.

The enforceability of “claw back” clauses has been thrown into doubt by the decision of the Queensland Supreme Court in GWC Property Group Pty Ltd v Higginson [2014] QSC 264.

In GWC the tenant and the landlord entered into a lease and on the same day entered into an incentive deed. The incentive deed was recited to “supplement the lease” and recited that the landlord had agreed to, among other things, contribute to the tenant’s fit-out and  grant a rent abatement. The incentive deed also provided for repayment of part of the landlord’s contributions if the lease was terminated (other than by expiry of the term or the lessor’s default) or if the tenant parted with possession without the landlord’s consent. The obligation to repay was guaranteed by guarantors.

The landlord terminated the lease after the leased premises were abandoned by the tenant. The court decided that:

(a)          the lease and the incentive deed had to be construed as if they were one document;

(b)          the obligation to repay only arise if there a termination;

(c)           the tenant could be obliged to repay the landlord’s contributions for reasons other than the tenant’s breach – for example where the tenant went into liquidation or following a natural disaster;

(d)          the repayment obligation should not be viewed as a restitutionary payment;

(e)          in addition to contractual damages for breach of the lease, the  landlord was entitled, by the repayment clauses, to recover substantial additional payments;

(f)           the repayment obligation were not a genuine pre-estimate of damage.

The court decided that the obligation to repay landlord’s contributions was a penalty and was therefore not enforceable.

The case contains a good discussion about the law of penalties. Thanks to Tony Burke of Burke & Associates Lawyers Pty Ltd for alerting me to GWC.

Advisers must consider registration of leases

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Lawyers acting for landlords of non-retail premises where the proposed lease term exceeds 3 years need to seriously consider whether to register the lease. This is one of the consequences of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Cooma Clothing Pty Ltd v Create Invest Develop Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 106.   If the lease is not registered, the term of the lease is assigned and the landlord is not a party to the assignment document, the assignee of the term will have the benefit of the contract but be excused from the burden of the contract.

In Victoria, a lease for a term in excess of 3 years may be registered. See: s.66 of the Transfer of Land Act 1966.  A lease made by deed for a term of less than 3 years is also a legal lease. However, an unregistered lease for a term exceeding 3 years is a lease in equity.

In Cooma the facts were:

• the owner (Landlord) entered into a contract to sell land to a purchaser (Purchaser) which land was also leased to a tenant (Tenant) for a term of less than 3 years (Lease). The term of the Lease was close to its expiry date.


• Before settlement and before expiry of the term of the Lease, the Purchaser’s  agent wrote to the Tenant (Agent’s Letter) offering a new for a term of 3 years commencing upon expiry of the Lease . The Tenant accepted the agent’s offer by signing the Agent’s letter (Agreement for Lease)


• thereafter the Landlord, the Tenant and a third party (New Tenant) signed a documented entitled “Transfer of Lease” that assigned the balance of the term of the Lease to the New Tenant (Transfer).


• The Transfer contained a special condition in which the New Tenant acknowledged receiving the Agent’s Letter (ie the letter from the Purchaser to the Tenant) “in relation to the Lease renewal” and in which the New Tenant acknowledged and consented to the terms and conditions for the renewal of the Lease.


• The New Tenant occupied the land before the expiry of the Lease and the Purchaser became the registered owner of the leased land before the expiry of the Lease.


• Shortly after the expiry of the Lease the New Tenant vacated the premises. The Purchaser contended that the New Tenant was obliged to comply with the  covenants contained in the Agreement for Lease. The New Tenant contended that it had the benefit of an option to renew or extend the Lease for a further 3 years which option had not been taken up. The Purchaser was successful in VCAT and in the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held:

(a)        the Lease was a legal lease because it was for a term not exceeding 3 years;

(b)        the Tenant’s signing of the Agent’s Letter gave rise to an equitable lease between the Purchaser and the Tenant (ie the Agreement for Lease);

(c)        it was irrelevant that when the Agreement for Lease was made there was no privity of estate between the Purchase and the Tenant (ie because the Purchaser was not the owner of the land) because it was well established that a if two parties contract as landlord and tenant neither of them can deny the title of the other;

(d)        a party to a contract for a lease that is not a legal lease (ie such as the Agreement for Lease) may assign the benefit of the contract but may not assign the burden;

(e)        thus, the Transfer (which transferrred the Agreement for Lease from the Tenant to the New Tenant) was incapable of subjecting the New Tenant to the burden of the Agreement for Lease and under the general law this remained so ever after the New Tenant entered into possession under the Lease;

(f)         after the Purchaser was registered as proprietor of the land it became, by reason of ss.141 and 142 of the Property Law Act 1958, entitled to the benefit and the burden of the Lease;

(g)       however, the assignment of the Agreement for Lease from the Tenant to the New Tenant had the effect of assigning the benefit of the contract to the New Tenant but not assigning the burden.

Thus, the position at general law was that the New Tenant had the benefit of the Agreement for Lease but was not subject to the burden of the Agreement for Lease.

Fortunately for the Purchaser the Agreement for Lease was a “retail premises” lease within the meaning of s.4 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (2003 Act). See also s.3 of the 2003 Act.  Section 8 of the 2003 Act provides that an assignment of a lease results in a continuation of the lease as opposed to creation of a new lease. Accordingly, despite the lack of privity of contract and estate between the New Tenant and the Purchaser, the transfer of the executory contract for a new lease (ie by the Transfer the Agreement for Lease was assigned) was in effect deemed by s.8 to have created privity of contract between them and thus conferred on the Purchaser a direct right of enforcement against the New Tenant.

The most important points arising from this case are that serious consideration needs to be given to whether a lease should be registered and, if the lease is not to be registered, ensuring that the clause governing assignments requires the landlord to be a party to the assignment document so as to ensure there is privity of contract between the landlord and the assignee of the term.

I will be doing a further blog concerning this case (stay tuned)

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Be wary of unrepresented parties at mediations

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Mediations at which parties are unrepresented or not represented by lawyers are fraught with risk. Even with legal representation mediations are stressful, particularly where the mediation is only fixed for a half day and there is pressure to avoid long winded discussions about the facts. Experienced mediators invariably offer unrepresented parties an adjournment so that legal advice can be obtained. VCAT recently decided case in which landlords sought to set aside terms of settlement agreed at a half day mediation conducted by the Small Business Commissioner. In Wong v Hook Line and Sinker Fish and Chips Pty Ltd [2013] VCAT 263 the landlords sought to have the terms of settlement set aside on the grounds of undue influence or duress by the mediator and a barrister.  At the mediation the parties had been in dispute about whether the tenant was being required to pay “key money” under a lease contrary to s.23 of the Retail Leases Act 2003. The terms of settlement required the parties to appoint a valuer to determine the market rent. The landlords were not represented by a lawyer at the mediation but were represented by an advocate who held himself out as an expert in retail tenancy matters and who prepared written submissions. The mediator was highly experienced and was accompanied by a trainee mediator. The tenant was represented by an experienced barrister. The mediator offered the landlords the opportunity to adjourn the mediation to enable them to obtain legal advice but the offer was declined. The landlords subsequently refused to appoint the valuer to determine the market rent and commenced a proceeding alleging that the terms of settlement had been obtained by undue influence or duress. At the hearing the mediator, the trainee mediator, the tenant's barrister at the mediation, representatives of the tenant, the landlords and the landlords' advocate all gave evidence. The Tribunal rejected all of the the landlords’ claims. An application for leave to appeal has been filed.

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Tenant cannot question the landlord's title

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In Create Invest Develop Pty Ltd v Cooma Clothing Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1907  VCAT had to decide the effect of a contract entered into by a tenant with a party that was not the registered proprietor of the leased land but who subsequently became the registered proprietor. The case is a good illustration of the principle that if two parties contract with each other as landlord and tenant, neither of them is entitled to deny the title of the other unless some other person by way of title paramount intervenes and disturbs the possession of landlord and tenant. In Create there was a lease in place the term of which was expiring on 31 January 2011 (“Original Lease”). 

In 2010 the land was offered for sale and the Applicant purchaser entered into a contract of sale with the landlord ("Landlord"). Before settlement, the Applicant purchaser offered the existing tenants a lease for a term of three years commencing 1 February 2011 which offer included a clause that permitted the landlord to terminate the lease to demolish or redevelop the premises and contemplated the execution of further documents including a lease that contained a demolition clause and guarantees. The tenants signed the offer (“the Lease Renewal”). Later, in 2010, the Landlord, the tenants and the Respondent signed a document styled “Transfer of Lease” which assigned the term of the Original Lease to the Respondent and contained a special condition in which the Respondents acknowledged being given a copy of the Lease Renewal and consent its terms and conditions. 

In late 2010 the transfer of the freehold reversion was registered. In March 2011 the Respondent vacated the property and was sued by the Applicant for damages that comprised mainly rent for the period from 1 February 2011 pursuant to the Lease Renewal. The basis of the damages claim was that the Respondent was obliged to perform the Renewed Lease. 

The Respondent contended that all that had occurred was that it had an option to renew or extend the Original Lease which option it had not taken up.  The Respondent argued that at the time the Lease Renewal was made the Applicant was not the legal owner of the reversion and not entitled to the rents and profits as a purchaser and therefore there was no privity of estate or contract between the Applicant and the Respondent. 

The Respondent also argued that what had taken place did not amount to a “renewal” of a lease within the meaning of s 9 of the Retail Leases Act 2003, the 2003 Act did not contemplate leases that were entirely prospective, and the Lease Renewal was not a concluded agreement. All the Respondent’s contentions were rejected by the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Respondent as tenant was estopped from questioning the Applicant landlord’s title and therefore it was irrelevant that the Applicant was not the registered proprietor of the land when the Lease Renewal was entered into. The Tribunal also held that while the Lease Renewal contemplated the execution of further documents there was a binding contract, the Lease Renewal was not a renewal but the entry by the parties into a new lease.       

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Option not exercised because of default

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In Computer & Parts Land Pty Ltd v Property Sunrise Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1522 the Tribunal was asked to determine whether an option contained in a lease was not exercisable by the tenant because of breaches of the lease that enlivened s.27(2) of the Retail Leases Act 2003 .  Section 27(2) provides that the "only circumstances" in which an option is not exercisable is if the "tenant has not remedied any defaults under the lease about which the landlord has given the tenant written notice" (s.27(2)(a)) or " the tenant has persistently defaulted under the lease throughout its term and the landlord has given the tenant written notice of the defaults" (s.27(2)(b)). Section 27(2)(b) is ambiguous: what is meant by "persistently", what is meant by "throughout its term", does a landlord have to give notice of each default or is one notice that describes all the defaults adequate? There have been a number of cases concerning s.27(2) all of which have avoided giving any definitive answers to these questions. 

See: for example, Westgate Battery  Company Pty Ltd v GCA Pty Ltd [2005] VCAT 2080 and Westside Real Estate Investments Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 1830. In this case the term of  the lease was four years with two options for four year terms. The landlord relied on s.27(2)(a) and (b) in alleging that the option had not been exercised because at the time of the purported exercise the tenant had not remedied a default and the tenant had persistently defaulted under the lease throughout the four year term of the first option period. Firstly, the  Tribunal held that s.27(2) prevailed over the provisions contained in the lease concerning the exercise of the option.  

There had been nine occasions “over two stretches” when the rent was not paid on time and the rent had never been more than five weeks’ late. The Tribunal held that in those circumstances it was not “persuaded that the late payments could be described as ‘persistent’ (in the sense of ‘persevering’ or ‘constantly repeated’)" and that the late repayments had not occurred “throughout” the term of the lease.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal held that the option had not been exercised because when the tenant exercised the option it had failed to provide a bank guarantee as required by the lease and the landlord had given written notice of the default  (s. 27(2)(a)).  Rectification of the default after the purported exercise of the option did not alter the position.

The tenant sought relief against forfeiture of the option. The Tribunal followed the decision of Dixon J in Lontav Pty Ltd v Pineross Custodial Services Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2011] VSC 485 in  holding that VCAT had no power to grant relief against forfeiture of an option.

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Tenant seeks to overturn VCAT's exclusive jurisidiction

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In Ireland v Subway Systems Australia Pty Ltd and Subway Realty Pty Ltd [2012] VCAT 1061 a tenant contended if an agreement (which it contended was a licence) was held to be a lease then the dispute had to be determined by an arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration clause and not by VCAT.  The arbitration clause was contained in the a document separate from the lease.

VCAT held that the agreement was a lease and therefore there was a "retail tenancy dispute" which, subject to the tenant's argument about the Commercial Arbitration Act, would be governed by the dispute provisions of the RLA. If the tenant's application had succeeded the whole regime of the dispute resolutions provisions in the RLA would have been displaced. The tenant argued that the arbitration clause should be given effect to because s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 was pronounced after the commencement of the 2003 Act and, by implication, repealed the provisions of the RLA that gave exclusive jurisdiction  concerning retail tenancy disputes to VCAT.  

The tenant contended that the word “court”  in s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act included the Tribunal. At [45] the Tribunal accepted that there was authority supporting the proposition that, in some cases, the reference to a “court” will include the Tribunal. The tenant contended that to construe the word “court” in the Commercial Arbitration Act to include the Tribunal would not create inconsistency between that Act and the RLA because the Commercial Arbitration Act was a later Act of Parliament which would, by implication repeal the inconsistent provisions of the RLA.  In rejecting the tenant’s contentions the Tribunal said:

 [50]       I do not accept that submission. In Goodwin v Phillips (1908) 7 CLR 1 at 10, Barton J adopted the following statement from Hardcastle on Statutory Law:

The court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together, before they can from the language of the later imply the repeal of an express prior enactment, i.e., the repeal must, if not express flow from the necessary implication.

[51]       Further, in Saraswati v R (1991) 100 ALR 193 Gaudron J stated the following;

It is a basic rule of construction that, in the absence of express words, an earlier statutory provision is not repealed, altered or derogated from by a later provision unless an intention to that effect is necessarily to be implied. There must be very strong grounds to support the implication, for there is a general presumption that the legislature intended that both provisions should operate and that, to the extent that they would otherwise overlap, one should be read as subject to the other (at 204)

[53]         In my view, limiting the word court in s 10 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 to mean the Magistrates’ Court, County Court or Supreme Court would not lead to any inconsistency between the two Acts and is a construction that is to be adopted, having regard to the authorities cited above. Accordingly, I do not accept the submission that the word court in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 includes the Tribunal. It simply cannot be the case that Parliament intended that the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 and the RLA were to cover the same field of operation. The RLA is expressed elaborately and specifically details how retail tenancy disputes are to be resolved. The Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 says nothing about resolving retail tenancy disputes and is expressed in a general manner. In my view, that is another factor weighing against a finding that Parliament intended the provisions of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 to take precedence over the dispute resolution provisions of the RLA. Accordingly, I find that the word court in the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 does not include the Tribunal and as a consequence, the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 has no application in determining the present dispute.

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 Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Can the landlord pass on the costs of complying with the Building Act?

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Some of Melbourne’s finest legal minds are spending long hours trying to solve the question of whether a landlord can recover from a tenant the costs of complying with the landlord’s obligations under the Building Act 1993 (Act) and regulations.

Much of the debate concerns s 251  which provides that:

“(1)    If the owner of a building or land is required under this Act or the

          regulations to carry out any work or do any other thing and the owner does not carry out the work or           do the thing, the occupier of that building or land or any registered mortgagee of the land or the land               on which the building is situated, may carry out the work or do the thing.

(2)        An occupier may-

(a)        recover any expenses necessarily incurred under subsection (1) from the owner as a debt due to the              occupier; or

(b)        deduct those expenses from or set them off against any rent due or to become due to the owner.

.....

(6)        This section applies despite any covenant or agreement to the  contrary.”

             Underlining added

In my  the view the effect of s.251 is that if the owner is required by the Act or the regulations to carry out any work or do any other thing and does not carry out the work or do the thing:

(a)        the tenant can do the work that the landlord was obliged to do and  recover the costs from the                      landlord owner as a debt; and

(b)        the tenant can set-off the costs of doing the work that the landlord owner was obliged to do against                the rent; and

(c)        the usual rent covenant that rent must be paid "without deduction" will not assist the landlord if it fails             to comply with s.251 and the tenant does the work that the landlord was obliged to do (Chen v                    Panmure Hotel Pty Ltd[1]). 

However, s 251 does not answer the question whether a building owner can recover from the tenant the owner's costs of complying with its obligations under the Act and regulations. In other words, can the tenant be obliged to pay the owner’s costs of complying with the Act and regulations when s 251 has not been enlivened?

Section 39 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (2003 Act) permits a landlord to recover outgoings from the tenant by appropriately drawn provisions in a lease. Section 41(1) of the 2003 Act makes void a provision in a lease that requires the tenant to pay an amount in respect of capital costs. Thus it is clear that the tenant could never be required to pay an amount in respect of capital works.

In my view, if s 251 is enlivened by the owner failing to do works that it was required to do under the Act and the tenant does that work, the owner cannot, pursuant to provisions in a lease, recover from the tenant the costs that the owner pays to the tenant under s 251.

But where 251 of the Act has not been enlivened and the owner seeks to recover from the tenant the costs that it has incurred in complying with the Act, it is not clear to me why the landlord should not be able to recover those costs from the tenant. Proponents of the view that the landlord cannot recover the costs will refer to Café Dansk Pty Ltd v Shiel[2] where Deputy President Macnamara (as his Honour then was) held that a landlord could not recover from the tenant the costs of complying with s 52 of the 2003 Act. In my view there are good arguments as to why Café Dansk is not correct, but even if it be assumed that the decision is correct the logic applied in Café Dansk does not necessarily apply when considering the Act. The Act and the 2003 Act are directed at different things. The Act is concerned with ensuring the safety of persons using buildings; its provisions are directed solely to that end; and it says nothing about the ultimate allocation of the costs of complying with the Act while the 2003 Act,  and s 52 in particular, is remedial leglislation concerned with restoring the balance of rights as between landlords and tenants. In my view it is not at all clear that there is anything in the Act that rebuts the presumption that an Act is not to be construed as taking away existing common law rights unless the legislative right to do so is clear[3]. I am not convinced that it is clear that Parliament intended to take away the contractual right to pass on the costs of compliance.    

---

[1] [2007]VCAT 2463

[2] [2009]VCAT 2009.

[3] Pearce, D.C and Geddes, R.S, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 7^th ed, LexisNexis, 2011, paragraphs 5.27, 5.28 and 5.35.

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Beware of lease variations

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It is trite law that a slight variation to a lease may effect a surrender and re-grant. See: Pascoe-Webbe  v Nuguna Pty Ltd (1985) 3 BPR 97,231 (SC, NSW per Young J).

 In Richmond Football Club Limited v Verraty Pty Ltd [2011] VCAT 2104 a variation to a lease had major consequences for an unwitting and unfortunate landlord. The lease, which had been made in 1998, was for a term of 10 years with an option for a further term of 10 years and required the tenant to pay land tax and outgoings.

In 2004 the lease was varied: the changes included reducing the rent, amending the bank guarantee and rent review provisions, introducing an obligation to pay GST and extending the lease term by 10 years. The tenant contended that the variation effected a surrender and re-grant with the consequence that from the date of the variation the Retail Leases Act 2003 applied to the lease.

By reason of s.50 of the 2003 Act a provision in a lease requiring a tenant to pay land tax is void. Also, by reason of s.46 of the 2003 Act a tenant was not required to contribute to outgoings until given a statement of outgoings. The tenant sought recovery of land tax and outgoings paid after the variation.

The landlord claimed that the tenant was estopped from alleging that a surrender and re-grant occurred; this submission was rejected on two bases, namely that the tenant had not been aware of its rights until 2009 and the provisions of the 2003 Act could not be circumvented on the basis of estoppel.

The tenant sought recovery of the land tax and outgoings on the basis that they were paid under a mistake because the tenant was unaware that it had no liability to do so.

 Consequently, there was a total failure of consideration and therefore the landlord was obliged to repay the amount paid by way of land tax and outgoings as money had and received.

The landlord’s defences based on estoppel and unconscionable conduct failed. The landlord also relied on Ovidio Carrideo Nominees Pty Ltd v The Dog Depot Pty Ltd (2006)VSCA 6 in alleging that good consideration had been provided by the landlord for the payments; this claim was rejected with respect to land tax because there was no obligation on a tenant to pay land tax and s.50 of the 2003 Act expressly prohibited a tenant from recovering land tax.

The landlord’s argument based on The Dog Depot was successful with respect to outgoings because outgoings were part of the consideration payable by the tenant; the tenant received a benefit in exchange for the payment of outgoings and therefore the tenant’s claim for money had and received failed. The landlord also relied on The Dog Depot to claim compensation for lost land tax based on the tenant’s use and occupation of the premises; this claim failed because consideration had not been given for the payment of the land tax. The tenant recovered $125,320 in land tax, being all the land tax paid that was not caught by the Limitations of Actions Act 1958.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience

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Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Detailed examination required to determine if a tenant has parted with possession of leased premises

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Most leases preclude the tenant from parting with possession of the leased premises  without the prior written consent of the lessor. It is not always easy to determine whether a tenant has parted with possession and invariably a detailed examination of the facts is required.

In Lontav Pty Ltd v Pineross Custodial Services Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 278 Hargrave J undertook such an examination following which he held that the tenant had not parted with possession despite strong prima facie evidence that it had done so.

In Lontav the tenant had been negotiating with a potential purchaser of the  tenant's hotel business. The tenant and the purchaser had an understanding that no sale could take place until the purchaser had obtained  the necessary liquor licencing approvals and the landlord's approval. Even though it was not clear that a purchase price had been agreed a "deposit" was paid.

The purchaser also engaged solicitors to help him transfer the liquor licence and a company was incorporated to hold the liquor licence ("the proposed assignee") as the licensee of the liquor licencee. The tenant sought the landlord's approval to an assignment of the balance of the term of the lease to the proposed assignee. The lessor refused to consider the proposed assignment until all overdue rent and outgoings were paid in full.

The tenant signed the application to transfer its liquor licence to the proposed assignee.  The liquor licence transfer application form required that there be confirmation that "settlement has occurred" before a licence would be issued. Hargrave J interpreted this to mean that there had to be confirmation that the sale of business contract had been settled and the tenant had assigned the lease.

By mistake a new liquor licence was issued to the proposed assignee.  The principal of the tenant was diagnosed with a serious illness with the consequence that the tenant and the principal of the proposed assignee ("the manager") entered into a management agreement to manage the tenant's business. This agreement required the manager to guarantee the financial commitments  made by the tenant and losses incurred by the tenant from the date of his appointment.

The manager commenced managing the hotel business and despite him not being authorised by the management agreement to do so, he paid rent and staff using the proposed assignee's bank account rather than the tenant's bank account. The proposed assignee also paid for significant renovations and was noted on an insurance certificate as an insured. 

Hargrave J approached the question of whether the tenant had parted with possession by determining whether the management agreement, if implemented according to its terms, had the effect that the tenant retained legal possession of the premises. His Honour decided that because of the seriousness of the illness suffered by the principal of the tenant, no variation to the management agreement should be inferred from the tenant's acquiescence in the manager's departure from the management agreement.

His Honour decided that upon the proper construction of the management agreement the tenant had not parted with possession, but  because of other breaches of the lease the landlord was entitled to terminate the lease and had done so. The tenant was granted relief against forfeiture. 

For those interested in examining when a tenant can be said to have parted with possession have a look at the Queensland Court of Appeal decision in ACE Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] QCA 55.

My clerk can be contacted via this link http://www.greenslist.com.au/ if you wish to retain my services for any legal matter which is within the gamut of my legal experience.

Author: Robert Hays Barrister subject to copyright under DMCA.

Can a landlord's failure to comply with s.52 consitute repudiatoryconduct?

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Does a landlord's failure to comply with its obligations under s.52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 to maintain premises in "a condition consistent with the condition of the premises when the retail premises lease was entered into" constitute repudiatory conduct?

This issue was raised in C & A Delaveris Pty Ltd  v Bretair Pty Ltd  [2009]VCAT 1663 [28], [79] and [80] but not ultimately decided.  The implication of a statutory obligation as a lease covenant “invites the application of the full range of the general law principles with respect to competing covenant obligations” (Croft and Hay Retail Leases Victoria, para  [70,005]).

In Delvaris the Tribunal considered the relationship between the usual “no deductions” rent covenant and a statutory repair covenant.  The tenant withheld rent because of a failure to carry out urgent repairs.  Delvaris concerned ss25 and 47 of the predecessor to the 2003 Act but those provisions are the same as ss.52 and 94 of the 2003 Act.   Section 94 renders void any provision that is contrary to or inconsistent with the Act. In refusing an application for possession the Tribunal said at [84]:

“It is in accordance with well established practice to allow a setoff of the liquidated sum incurred by a tenant in meeting a repair obligation owed by the landlord and reducing the rental liability accordingly Lee-Parker v Izzet [1971] 1 WLR 1688, 1692-3 per Goff J. The amount of the outlay is liquidated and so the complication relating to unliquidated setoffs do not exist.”

 By reason of s.94 of the Act, where set-off and similar arguments are raised with respect to s.52, the section’s terms or operation cannot be abrogated by lease provisions such as a rent clause that requires the payment of rent "without deduction". Deputy President Macnamara said the following about this issue at [79]:

 “It seems to me arguable first, that the withholding or at least delay of the payment of rent was justified and secondly, that there were no threats of illegal action which could be regarded as economic duress in the circumstances. It will be recalled that the covenant to pay rent under this lease was a covenant to pay ‘without deductions’. 

The authorities are not at one as to whether the inclusion of these words is sufficient to prevent any equitable setoff being relied upon to impeach the demand for rent. For the reasons which I gave in Wytell Pty Ltd v Glowinski [2006] VCAT 454 the balance of authority in Victoria favours the view that the words ‘without deduction’ exclude a tenant from relying upon equitable set offs to impeach the demand for rent. 

Here, however, the covenant which the tenant alleged was being breached was one which in accordance with Section 25 of the 1998 Act as amended, the lease was ‘taken to provide’, that is, it was a statutory implied covenant. 

Section 47 of the 1998 Act provides that a provision in a retail lease is void to the extent that it claims to ‘exclude the application of any provision of this Act’. In my view, the inclusion of the words ‘without deduction’ in the covenant to pay rent is avoided by Section 47 to the extent that it limits the effect that the statutory implied covenant to repair would otherwise have, hence a breach of the repair covenant would be available as a setoff in the present case….it is clear that withholding rent in the circumstances described or delaying its payments was not a flagrant breach of the terms of the lease and obviously illegal. 

More pertinently since this step was taken to compel the lessor to do what I have held it was obliged to do any way under the terms of Section 25.”

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Put in repair obligations not contrary to s.52 of the Retail Leases Act2003

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In Retail Leases Victoria (Croft and Hay, LexisNexis) expressed the view (at para [70,005]) that a repair obligation imposed on a tenant that went beyond the obligation imposed on a landlord under s.52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 would not be void under s.94 on the basis that it was contrary to or inconsistent with s.52.

The authors suggest that a provision in a lease that imposed a “put in repair” obligation on the tenant and which obliged it not to pick up the landlord’s "keep in repair" obligation under s.52, but rather, to place the premises, plant and equipment and fixtures and fittings in a higher standard of repair than they were in “when the retail lease was entered into” would be effective. Croft and Hay state (at para [70,005]) that a repair covenant that required the tenant to make up the "gap" between the fruits of a landlord's "keep in repair" covenant and a "put in repair" covenant" might be effective provided the lease provisions clearly established a capital works obligation on a tenant at its expense for the purposes of s.41(2).

In the authors' view there appeared to be no reason why the landlord could not enforce this obligation and, if necessary, recover the cost of the tenant's repair obligations as an "outgoing" (as defined in s 3) under s 39 . Croft and Hay's views were adopted by VCAT in Computer & Parts Land Pty Ltd v Aust-China Yan Tai Pty Ltd [2010] VCAT 2054 (at para [199] to [205]; see in particular para [203]) in deciding that a clause in a lease which required the tenant to contribute $3300 towards the cost of an air-conditioning system was a “put in repair” obligation with the consequence that the tenant had to reimburse the landlord for that cost.

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Goods left on premises after the expiry or termination of a lease

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On 1 September 2011 the law governing goods left on leased premises following the termination of a lease will be governed by Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act 1999. Part 2D replaces the repealed ss.42A to 42F of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1958. Part 2D applies to “goods under bailment” (s.32ZS(1)).

A landlord is not usually the voluntary recipient of goods left on leased premises. The drafters of the legislation have assumed that a bailment exists in the absence of a conscious and willing assumption of the possession of the goods; they do not appear to have been concerned about Palmer’s statement that the approach of the English courts has been to deny that the involuntary recipient of goods is a bailee (Palmer, N.P, Palmer on Bailment, 2009, Sweet & Maxwell, page 703).  

Part 2D also fails to include a satisfactory definition of “bailment”. Section 32ZP of the proposed Part 2D of the Fair Trading Act defines  “bailment” as including:

“bailment for reward, bailment in the course of business, gratuitous bailment, involuntary bailment and any sub-bailment”. (underlining added)

 Unfortunately the expression “involuntary bailment” is not defined. Part 2D would have no application at all if VCAT or a court were to determine that a bailment relationship did not arise between a landlord and a tenant with respect to uncollected goods in premises following the expiry or determination of the lease.

A landlord could face the risk of being liable in conversion if it disposed of the goods. The legislation appears to be mainly concerned with ensuring that the bailee is paid moneys owing in respect of goods; however, a landlord is not usually owed money with respect to goods: the landlord is usually owed rent or outgoings. Part 2D establishes different regimes for the disposal of goods with each regime dependent on the value of the goods. The relevant values are: less than $200; less than $5000 and more than $5000. Part 2D does not affect the right of parties to a lease to make an agreement about the disposal of uncollected goods (Section 32ZS(6)).

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